The

100 Yen

ONE KOREA

General Kim Given 10 Years

For Obeying UN Command

Militarists' Fantastic Plan

An Impossibility

World-wide Protests Raised

Against Hangings

Frequent Counter-coup Plots

Isolation of Junta

No. 8

February 1962

Our Aims and Demands

Liberation from Japanese Imperialism did not bring complete freedom and independence to Korea. Instead, the Big Powers of the world split the Korean territory and nation into two countries. And to this day, the Korean people have been suffering for sixteen long years under the most piteous and distressing conditions. Not only have we constantly wandered on the brinks of death, pressed by poverty and oppression, but we at last had to commit the most shameful mistake in our history: Incited by foreign powers, we Koreans engaged ourselves in the horrible task of killing our own brothers during that tragical Korean War. Yet, in spite of all these sufferings and injustices, the Korean people obediently held trust in the good faiths of the Big Powers, and solely believed that they would carve out the future of Korea for us.

But today we have finally realized our stupidity. We know well now that we must carve out our own destiny with our own hands, that is, the Korean nation must realize unification of Korea by the nation's own powers if it is willing to live. And the people's uprising in April last year which overthrew that most atrocious government of all times, the Syngman Rhee regime, without borrowing any aid from others, has given us the confidence that we can accomplish this aspiration.

We, as members of the Korean nation and campaigners for the unification movement, urged by such consciousness and confidence, propose here that our Independent and Peaceful Unification shall commence by conducting mutual contact and exchange between the North and South Korean people. Whereby, we are sure, brotherly love will be renewed and North and South negotiations invited; thus enabling concrete plans for unification to be worked out. We also believe that the unification must be not only the unification of the Korean territories but also of the divided nation. And in order to reflect the true will of the entire nation on the unification, we call for a Free General Elections to be held throughout North and South Korea; and through these elections, a Unified Central Government shall be established. From these standpoints, we demand:

1) *To immediately open up exchanges of letters, civilian travel, culture and trade between North and South Korea.*
2) *To convene at once an All-Korea Conference represented by delegates from the Governments, political parties and civil organizations of both Koreas, to study and work out the measures for preparing the All-Korea General Elections and establishing the Unified Central Government.*

We are convinced that these demands are fully legitimate, equitable and just since they are based on the standpoints of humanity, fundamental rights and the principle of self-determination. Still we cannot ignore the bearings which the Korean Unification problem has on the international relations. Thus emphasizing the original mission of the United Nations; respecting the authority of the 1954 Geneva Conference in which both the North and South Korean Delegations had participated, and acknowledging adoption of the Agreements reached at the said Conference, we request the nations concerned:

1) *To call as soon as possible an International Conference that shall further the accomplishments of the Political Conference on the Korean Question held at Geneva in 1954, and accelerate the Korean unification by assisting the independent unification movements of the Korean people.*
   Besides those nations which participated in the 1954 Conference, delegations from the four nations constituting the Korean Armistice Observation Commission (Switzerland, Sweden, Poland and Czechoslavakia) and India shall participate in the proposed Conference.
2) *All nations participating in this International Conference shall assume the responsibility to secure the peace in the Korean Peninsula and to guarantee the peaceful development of Unified Korea.*
   In order to secure these guarantees, the United States, the Soviet Union and all other countries shall immediately stop supplying weapons and all other military aids to the present Governments of North and South Korea; shall pledge to assist in the reconstruction of Korea on conditions of non-intervention in her internal affairs and also not to utilize Unified Korea as military bases; and shall recommend immediate membership of Unified Korea to the United Nations.
3) *The same nations shall also support, when requested, the projects of the Unification Projects Agency which will be established by tne All-Korea Confererecce, and also set up an International Supervision Commission to supervise the All-Korea General Elections which will be administered by the above Agency.*
   The International Supervision Commission shall be formed by nations that did not participate in the Korean War, but elected by the participating nations in the proposed International Conference and confirmed by the United Nations.
4) *The foreign armed forces stationed in Korea shall be replaced by International Police Forces ana evacuate Korea as soon as possible.*
   The International Police Forces shall be organized by troops from nations that did not participate in the Korean War; shall have missions to maintain the peace in Korea and also to secure an atmosphere in which free and fair elections can be enforced; and shall withdraw from Korea when requested by the Unified Korea Government.

Unification of Korea is a matter of life and death to the Korean people. No one, no nation should be allowed to bar our way. Therefore, we here appeal to the world to understand and to extend its support to our aims and demands.

ONE KOREA

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Total Isolation

Tne militarists have finally come out with their much-propagated Five-Year Economic Development Plan. Well it was that the Americans criticized it "fantastic," for the monstrous targets projected are obvious impossibilities within South Korea's capacities. Moreover, not one favorable factor exists to launch such economic adventure—the retrogressing economic growth, the drained up resources, the slackening purchasing power, the absence of business fervor etc. To attempt expanding the economy under such stagnant climate will certainly be building a "house upon sand." It is the most unredeemable trait not to know one's own limits. And tragical it will be for the nation that shall be harnessed to and driven on into such a reckless adventure.

The nation, moreover, is not promised a better life even after five years of scratching and toiling with the tremendous load on its back except that the country will become stronger in fighting wars. Having undergone all the atrocities, outrages and devastations committed, the nation can, in no ways, get in the mood to go along with the cruel, reckless and deceitful militarists. Discontent is spreading so much so that plots to overthrow the military dictatorship are springing up like mushrooms. And inspite of all the threats, arrests and crackdowns, newspapers of South Korea are getting ever bolder in criticizing the militarists' maladministration. Though somewhat belated, the entire nation, including the military men, is now giving the cold shoulder to the militarists.

On top of such total isolation, the militarists dared to push through an action to bring the wrath of the United States—their only notable ally—upon themselves. The junta's Revolutionary Court recently sentenced, in defiance of U.S. opposition, a former ROK Corps commander to 10 years in prison. The unfortunate general had only obeyed the orders of the U.N. commander but was punished for "obstructing the May 16 coup." If the general is to be punished on the count of "anti-revolutionary" activity, the U.N. commander who gave the order too should be held responsible. Now, when needed, Park Chung Hee will always utter phrases like "we respect the authority and competence of the United Nations," but once out of reach, he will trample upon anything. Such breach of faith, however, shall turn even those most devoted countries away from the militarists. The United States at the same time, must have realized that it has been nurturing a poisonous snake in its own bosom.

GENERAL KIM GIVEN 10 YEARS FOR OBEYING UN COMMAND

Rebuffing U.S. "representation," the ROK military junta pushed through the sensational trial on the "6th ROK Army Corps Case" and the ex-Corps Commander Maj. Gen. Kim Ung-Soo was given 10 years in prison for "obstructing the May 16 coup." The general had only obeyed the orders of the U.N. Commander. So, theoretically, U.S. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, then commander of the U.N. forces, should be held responsible too. As the case cuts right into the essence of the "command question" and U.S. prestige is at stake, the developments are to be watched.

I Case and Controversy

Six Counts. Ex-Commander of the 6th Army Corps, Maj. Gen. Kim Ung-Soo and his subordinate officer, former Commander of the 8th Division, Brig. Gen. Chung Kang, were put on Revolutionary Trial on Jan. 11. The Prosecution in its indictment charged that the two defendants:

(1) pulled 5 ROK artillery battalions that had moved into Seoul in support of the May 16 coup, out of Seoul at the order of Lt. Gen. Ryan, commander of the U.S. 1st Army Corps;

(2) relayed to their subordinate soldiers the statement issued by then U.N. Forces Commander Gen. Carter B. Magruder, supporting the Democratic Chang Myun Government;

(3) ordered subordinate troops not to listen to the junta's broadcast but only to U.N. Forces broadcasts;

(4) placed Col Hong Song-Chul and another officer supporting the May 16 takeover under arrest;

(5) ordered the 21st Infantry Regiment under the 8th Division to prepare for reoccupying operation of Seoul; and

(6) marked out the deployment of the coup forces in Seoul and drafted an operation plan for the forces under their command.

The generals had only obeyed the orders of the U.N. Command. If they were to be charged of "anti-revolutionary" activities and punished on that account, the commanders of the U.N. Forces, that is the U.S. commanders should be held equally guilty of the charge. The argument raised lifted the case into an open ROK junta versus U.S. controversy.

U.S. "Representation." Disturbed by the developments of the trial, the U.S. State Department, reportedly, ordered on Jan. 23 its ambassador to Seoul, Samuel D. Berger, to look into the case. On Jan. 25 the American Embassy in Seoul confirmed that it had made "certain representations" to the military government. According to informed sources of Seoul, the "representations" included U.S. request to "drop the charges" on the two generals.

Confronted with the extraordinary open U.S. intervention, the junta instructed its Revolutionary Prosecution to drop the first 3 counts charged in the indictment but the Prosecution went on to demand on Jan. 26 life imprisonment for the defendants on the remaining 3 counts and it put Gen. Kim who had been on trial without confinement, under formal arrest.

Repulsion Against U.S. Intervention. After the prosecution presented its demands, Col. Park Chang-Am, Chief of the Revolutionary Prosecution issued a statement condemning Gen. Kim of committing "highly impeachable treason which can never be wiped clean" and confirming the Prosecution's firm stand, claimed: "in the name of national interest and justice, the Prosecution must demand severe punishment." Col. Park who was speaking in behalf of the junta, further stressed the independence of the ROK government and stated: "only by being able to punish the traitors by our own hands and through our own court, can we be proud of safegarding the national prestige and independence of our sovereignty. This we believe is the previlege of the state based on democratic ideas." So, the Revolutionary Court continued the trial and on Jan. 30 General Kim was pronounced guilty of "treason" and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

U.S. Prestige at Stake. Although counts 1, 2, and 3 were points that come directly under the operational control of the U.N. Commander over the ROK forces, the remaining counts 4,5 and 6 were also connected with the orders of the U.N. command since the points were instructed in the statement issued by General Magruder in support of the Chang Myun Government. So, the responsibility of the U.N. Comcander has, in no ways, been cleared by the arrangement.

Moreover, if "obeying U.N. command is to be punished as "treason," ROK military officers and men will doubtedlessly begin questioning the authority of the U.N. Forces in Korea, whereby the U.N. Forces' operational control over the ROK armed forces itself will be endangered. Thus, this recent "6th Army Corps Case" has placed the United States, which is supporting the ROK junta regardless of its unlawfulness, in a really tight fix and, depending on the developments, the U.S. policy and prestige in Korea might well be endangered.

Junta's Crucial Position. The United States Government did not make any open protest last Jan. 10 when General Chang Do Yung was sentenced to death by the Revolutionary Court. Now, the evident reason why it intervened formally in General Kim's case was because the general who had only obeyed orders from the U.N. commander, was being questioned; whereas those who actually gave the order were not questioned. Aware of the contradiction, the junta made its chief of the Revolutionary Prosecution Col. Park to declare in his foregoing statement: "we will do everything to support the operational control of the U.N. Forces" and dropped the charges directly connected with the operational control of the U.N. command.

In one aspect, the sentencing of General Kim, doubtlessly, was an action in repulse to the U.S. intervention. But just why did the junta which cannot hang on another day to its power without U.S. backing, take such action? It is because the military government clinched in a deadly power-struggle within the army itself must at first do away with its rivals.

II Cause and Effect

Mass Purges and Mass Release. Soon after succeeding in the May 16 takeover, Park Chung Hee and his followers crushed all the political forces by rounding up every powerful conservative and progressive leaders and disbanding all the political and social organizations. Then, by arresting some one hundred generals including such powerful military leaders as the commanders of the 1st and 2nd ROK Armies, they put a check on revival of any opposition. And by outsting Chang Do Yung and his faction from the junta, the central core of the coup consolidated around Park Chung Hee to build up their envisaged military dictatorship.

At this point, however, an unexpected interference jumped in. The U.N. Forces, that is the U.S. anxious over the losses impaired on the defense capacity by the

mass purges of ROK frontline commanders, filed a complaint to the junta. Even cocky Park Chung Hee could not reject the protest and had to release nearly all of the generals under arrest except those of the Chang Do Yung faction and also the generals like Lt. Gen. Paik In-Yup charged with illicit profiteering. Maj. Gen. Kim Ung-Soo too had been under detention since last May 20 but thanks to the U.N. Forces (U.S.) pressure, was released last Nov. 3.

Deadly Rivals. The mass release of these top brasses became a serious threat to the junta. Though luck had enabled the junta members to grab the government, the bulk of the members including Park Chung Hee himself are not combat-tested commanders but rear-line staff workers and, therefore, undecorated men without much support in front-line combat units. In cast contrast, most of the generals purged by the junta like Lt. Gen. Lee Hal-Lim, ex-commander of 1st Army, Lt. Gen. Choi Kyung-Nok, ex-commander of 2nd Army, and Maj. Gen. Kim Ung-Soo are decorated commanders who served many years as combat leaders and have vast support and popularity among the officers and men of the front line combat units. The difference has given the junta members an inferiority complex.

Nextly, there is this so-called "Eigth Graduates" (of the ROK Military Academy) group led by Col. Kim Chung-Pil, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, considered as the current power group within the junta. The members of this group are all staff-workers and not highly appraised within the army. Nevertheless, the group threw all those front-line commanders like Col. Park Chil-Ok, former commander of the 1st Airborne Combat Team and Col. Mun Jae-Jun former commander of the 6th Corps Artillery Unit who spearheaded the coup forces in the May 16 takeover, out of the junta and the group is tyrannizing over the government and the army. So, naturally, antipathy is heightening within the ranks of the front-line units to the great anxiety of the junta leaders.

Another Scapegoat. Bewildered by the threatening situation, the junta felt keen need to dig up another case involving major front-line commanders to succeed the trial of Chang Do Yung in order to put another scare on the front-line units and also to reestablish its crumbling prestige within the armed forces. Thus, General Kim was singled out as the scapegoat. Kim was unfortunate because all other generals of note who could have been tried on the same counts, like Lt. Gen. Lee Hal-Lim, for instance, were out of the country and "studying in the United States." Kim was the only general to be found at home.

Furthermore, Gen. Kim is grouped in the anti-junta faction collaborating with the "National Youth Corps" (Minjok Chongnyun Dan; formed by former premier Lee Bum-Suk). The interpretations is that by victimizing Gen. Kim the junta sought to get two birds with one stone.

At any rate, the "6th Army Corps Case" was an awkward hand played by the junta leaders suffering under an inferiority complex, in the power-game within the armed forces. And for that matter, the junta members are desparate as ever, for they may not be as lucky as before and surely they wont get two birds with one stone.

III Command Issue

Pusan Incident. The case, in the meantime, brought the controversial U.N. command issue to the fore again. The junta and the U.N. Command clashed head on concerning this question when the coup leaders moved ROK units without U.N. authorization in the May 16 takeover. Now just what is meant by this "command issue?"

The U.N. Command authority indicates the operational control of the U.N. Forces over the ROK armed forces. The authority originated from the Taijon Agreement signed between President Syngman Rhee

and Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander-in-chief of the U.N. Forces, on July 15, 1950. By this agreement, President Rhee, chased down into the southern tip of the Korean peninsula by the onrushing North Korean forces, handed the command of ROK units to the U.N. commander in accords with the July 7, 1950 U.N. Security Council Resolution.

Despite the agreement, the turnover of the command to the U.N. commander was soon to be the cause of frequent controversies. The first trouble occurred in May 1952 when Syngman Rhee stirred up the so-called Pusan Political Incident. As the Constitution practically disabled reelection of the President to a new term, Rhee enforced martial law over the area of the temporary capital of Pusan and by overpowering the National Assembly sought to ammend the Constitution. For this objective, he ordered then army chief of staff Lt. Gen. Lee Chong-Chan to move one division of combat units into Pusan by pulling it out from the front line. General Lee, however, rebuffed the order by using the authority of the U.N. Command as a shield.

The enfuriated Rhee tried to fire Gen. Lee by promoting Gen. Won Yong-Duk to the post of army chief of staff but meeting opposition of the U.N. Command, failed in the attempt. Unbreakable as he was, Rhee got the Constitution, ammended, nevertheless, by enlisting the support of military and ordinary police forces under Gen. Won command and got himself reelected. But the incident became a precedent to the following controversies involving the command issue.

Another Confusion. The next trouble occurred on June 18, 1953 when Syngman Rhee ordered release of North Korean prisoners held in prisoner camps under U.N. Command. Rhee who was against signing the Armistice, nominated Gen. Won as commander of the Provost Marshal Command, newly established by Rhee, in defiance of the U.N. Command and ordered the general to instruct military police despatched to the prisoner camps to free the prisoners. At the time, the U.N. Command was held responsible for the treatment of the Communist prisoners and as signing of the Armistice was near at hand, the incident implied dangers of developing into an international issue. So again the operational control of the U.N. Command over the ROK forces became an hot issue.

U.S. Clarification. Feeling the need to clarify the point on the controversial issue, the U.N. Command (U.S.) made the ROK government to promise: "The armed forces of the Republic of Korea shall be placed under the operational control of the U.N. Command so long as the U.N. Command holds the defense liabilities of the Republic of Korea" in the Proceedings of the ROK-U.S. talks held on Nov. 17, 1954. Thereafter frequent little confusions involving nomination of military commanders broke out but no major incident defying the authority of the U.N. Command was stirred up again.

Total Denial of U.N. Command Authority. On the occasion of the May 16 takeover, troops belonging to the 1st Marine Brigade, 6th Corps Artillery Unit and 1st Airborne Combat Unit stationed around Seoul was mobilized without the authorization of the U.N. Command to take over the "legitimate government elected through free elections" and safeguarded by the U.N. Forces in Korea. The operational control of the U.N. Command over the ROK armed forces was thoroughly ignored. How did the U.N. Command counter this breach on the U.N. Command authority? Counting only the immediate benefits to the cause of anti-Communism, the Command let everything go as a fait accompli and finally on May 26 made the following agreement with the junta in a joint meeting held to negotiate on the command issue.

(1) The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction declares that it has returned operational control of all ROK Armed Forces to the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command who will use his operational control only to defend Korea

from Communist aggression.

(2) The commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command has directed the return to former positions the 1st Marine Brigade and the 6th Corps artillery unit now on duty in Seoul to restore the strength at formerly defended front line areas.

(3) The commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command released to the control of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction the 30th Infantry Division, the 31st Infantry Division, the 1st Airborne Combat Team and five additional military police companies from forward units.

Based on the agreement, a "Capital Defense Command" was set up in Seoul under the Supreme Council supported by the above units.

Free to Stage Coups. Since the U.N. Command recognized, in this way, the military junta and degraded itself to the position to support the unlawful government, it no longer possesses the right to claim its authority over the ROK forces. Still perhaps from the standpoints of morality and prestige, it could not ignore the "6th Army Corps Case" wherein its commander had to be punished just for the sake of obeying the U.N. Command. The junta has certainly presented a headaching problem to the U.N. Command (U.S.). But all told, it is one's own fault for recognizing so shortsidedly the unlawful military government. The result is that any ROK force can now freely stage a coup without getting reprimanded by the U.N. Command.

Comments

Incidental Friction. The "6th Army Corps Case" is an incident where the incompatible demands of the United States and the ROK junta collided once more. By making "representations," the United State sought to secure the authority of the U.N. Forces in Korea and also set the authority of the U.N. Forces above the Supreme Council. The ROK junta, on the other hand, which considers the "operational control" of the U.N. Command over the ROK armed forces an obstacle to its aspiration to establish complete supremacy of the junta in the land, would like to put a check on the operational control in order to prevent occurrence of further coup d'etats by other ROK forces under U.N. Command. At any rate, the recent showdown did hardly touch on the fundamental relationship between the two governments and perhaps the view that sees it as an incidental friction arising between the two parties in the process of pursuing their joint objectives, seems to have hit the point.

What should be noted in relation to the attitude taken by the United States toward this case is the unprincipled character of U.S. foreign policy. The predicament of falling into the dilenma of having to back the ROK military government and secure the authority of U.N. Command at the same time, must be said the due fruit of such unprincipled policy.

Loss of U.S. Prestige. By overlooking the mutiny of the ROK coup forces against the U.N. authority and also by collaborating with the unlawful military government set up by those forces, the United States destructed the authority of the U.N. Forces in Korea and also undermined its prestige. No matter how much the United States may emphasize the authority of the U.N. now, it would be laughed upon as a farce by Koreans. The voice of the United States no longer carries weight in Korea.

Moreover, the fall of U.N. authority in Korea implies grave dangers. The precedent created by the present junta and the support being offered to it by the United States have been encouraging other elements to attempt coup d'etats. It could be said that equally power-hungry men within the army might be looking forward to the United States to back them up when they'd succeed in taking over the government.

So, the United States, instead of intervening in such incidents as this recent trial with vain hopes to reestablish the authority of the U.N. Forces in Korea, should assume the liability of having permitted the ROK forces under U.N. Command to go on with their takeover of the legitimate government last May. It should once and for all withdraw its recognition of the present ROK military government, which step will surely enable the United States to restore the authority of the U.N. Forces in Korea and the prestige of the United States as well.

Factional Map of ROK Army

Formation of Factions. Those in support of the military government have been publicizing that the excessive factionalism that existed within the ROK armed forces has been wiped out at last. But as shown by this trial on the "6th Army Corps Case" feuds between the various factions which had only been smoldering beneath are now surfacing again and the ruling junta certainly is in no position to rest assured; for, those factions within the armed forces considered as potential opposition to the junta far outnumber those forces in support of Park Chung Hee.

The ROK armed forces have been troubled by extreme factionalism ever since its establishment and factional strife has been criticized as the real sore spot of the military. The representative factions have been the ex-Japanese Army, the ex-Manchurian Army, the ex-Chinese Army, the Hamgyong-do, the Pyongan-do and the "National Youth Corps" factions. The first three factions show the lineage the partisans belonged to before the termination of World War II. Hamgyong-do and Pyongan-do are factions formed by soldiers hailing from the same provinces and as Hamgyong and Pyongan are provinces in North Korea, the existence of these powerful factions indicates the great number of soldiers that fled into South Korea after the end of World War II. The remaining "National Youth Corps" faction consists of soldiers affiliated with this rightest organization created by Gen. Lee Bum-Suk first premier of the Republic of Korea.

Although the latter three factions remain as powerful forces, the first three have virtually faded out with the duration of 17 years during which time old soldiers have retired and new career men who enlisted after the War have come to occupy most of the top posts and commands. In other words, the ROK armed forces have undergone a thorough change in generation and with it, the factional map has changed too.

Note: The following is a list of retired generals grouped according to their respective lineage; (in parenthesis are present post; rank in former army and highest post in ROK forces):

Ex-Japanese Army: Gen. Lee Hyung-Keun (Ambassador to Philippines; major; army chief of staff); Lt. Gen. Lee Jong-Chan (Ambassador to Italy; major; army chief of staff); Lt. Gen. Yoo Jae-Han (Ambassador to Thailand; major; army vice chief of staff)

Ex-Manchrian Army: Gen. Chung Il-Kwan (Ambassador to U.S.; captain; army chief of staff) Gen. Paik Sun-Yup (Ambassador to France; lieutenant; army chief of staff) Lt. Gen. Won Yong-Duk (retired; major; provost marshal commander) Lt. Gen. Kim Il-Hwan (retired; lieutenant; defense ministry director)

Ex-Chinese Army: Lt. Gen. Kim Hong-Il (retired; lt. gen.; superintendent Military Academy) Lt. Gen. Choi Duk-Shin) Foreign Minister; lt. col.; vice-commander army corps)

Regrouping of Factions. The regrouping of factions became active after the April Uprisings of 1960 in line with the mass purges of corrupt top level officers. Encouraged by the uprisings, junior officers demanded house-cleaning and, consequently, Lt. Gen. Choi Kyong-Nok, a

man of integrity, a top-grade soldier and popular leader of junior officers, was nominated army chief of staff and Lt. Gen. Lee Hal-Lim, considered as the foremost combat leader, was promoted to the post of 1st Army Commander. Generals and junior officers who had been sulking in obscurity during the Rhee era, now gathered under the wings of these two generals whereby the so-called Choi Kyong-Nok and Lee Hal-Lim factions emerged as the two new powerful groups. As Gen. Lee hails from Hamgyong-do, the commanders and soldiers that joined his group were mostly fellow provincials. There lay in wait however, another powerful group, the Pyongan-do faction. After losing its boss Gen. Paik Sun-Yup, Lt. Gen. Chang Do Yung (then 2nd Army Commander) and Lt. Gen. Paik In-Yup were hailed as their leaders The top officers of this group were henchmen of Syngman Rhee and had a lot to with the corruption under Rhee.

Another new trend that appeared was the forming of factions by fellow classmates of the ROK Military Academy. The "Eigth Graduate Class" group which now constitutes the core of the junta is a faction in this category and group solidity is said to be stronger among graduates of recent years.

These were the major factions that appeared after the April Revolution. Still it was not until Premier Chang Myun promoted Chang Do Yung, ringleader of all corrupt generals, to the post of army chief of staff, did these three giant factions led by Lee, Choi and Chang fully reveal their antagonisms. Finding Gen. Choi critical to his policies, Chang Myun sought to bolster his faltering government by enlisting the services of Chang, a fellow provincial. The discriminating nature of the replacement, however, poured oil on fire and feuds among the various factions burst wide open. Officers sympathizing with Gen. Choi (transferred to 2nd Army Commander) tightened their front. (Scenting the feud, the U.S. authorities sent Choi away to U.S. for study) and commanders and soldiers under Gen. Lee, enfuriated at the revival of the Pyongan-do faction, threatened to fight back.

It was at this time that the May 16 coup was staged. As already known, the coup was a surprise attack conspired by Park Chung Hee (then deputy-commander of 2nd Army) and Chang Do Yung with the consent of Premier Chang and the U.N. Command.

Park's House-Cleaning. As soon as they succeeded in the takeover, Park and Chang arrested Lt. Gen. Lee Hal-Lim, Lt. Gen. Kyang Yong-Hoon (superintendent of Military Academy) and Maj. Gen. Kim Ung-Soo and cracked down on the Lee Hal-Lim and National Youth Corps factions. Lt. Gen. Choi had just returned from U.S. but fearing his arrest would bring grave results, the junta could only sent him into retirement.

In the meantime, retired generals possessing vast influence like Chung Il-Kwan, Lee Hyung-Keun, Paik Sun-Yup, Lee Jong-Chan and Yoo Jae-Hung were packed off abroad as ambassadors.

Following the house-cleaning, Park now schemed to oust Chang Do Yung and his clique and succeeded in the attempt by early July. The notable point in this intrigue was that all the combat commanders who spearheaded the coup were thrown out from the junta, arrested and put away in prisons. (Colonel Mun Jae-Jun, commander of the 6th Corps Artillery Unit, Col. Park Chi-Ok and Lt. Col. Kim Che-Min commander and vice-commander of the 1st Airborne Combat Team were all tried for treason and given severe punishments)

Then Park arrested Lt. Generals Yang Kook-Chin, Paik In-Yup and Han Byung-Sun on charges of illicit profiteering and also brought counter-coup charges on the defendants of the "6th Army Corps Case," the "30th Infantry Division Case" and the "Kim Dong-Bok Case" to wipe out the opposition among junior officers.

Weight of Park Faction. Inspite of the mass purges and house-cleaning, the

(Continued on Page 21)

MILITARISTS' FANTASTIC PLAN

An Impossibility

The ROK militarists have finalized their over-publicized Five-Year Economic Plan. The stupendous figures listed might be useful for propaganda purposes or whipping up the reluctant nation but precarious as it is, the plan has no chance of succeeding. As U.S. officials have commented, this is another "fantastic" economic adventure that will take the nation to further ruins.

Stupendous Figures and Targets

Still "House Upon Sand". After five months of extensive and clamorous ballyhoo about reconstructing and industrializing ROK economy while it has been crumbling down to disastrous points, the military government finally came out with its "First Five-Year Economic Reconstruction Plan" on January 13. Although some modifications have been done on the draft plan made public last July 22 (See One Korea, vol. 3, page 31), the keynote remains the same: So much money is going to be spent and the nation is going to be launched on an auspicious and painstaking race. The long period spared for the drafting apparently did not help the militarists much, for the plan is still a "house upon sand." Statistics of economy which should be the basis for any planned economy have been totally ignored. The following stupendous figures and targets eloquently show how fantastic the plan is:

7.1% Growth Rate. The final plan calls for an annual economic growth rate of 7.1% or 40.8% during the five-year period. The draft plan had set the target at 46.3%. It must be noted that the militarists themselves have admitted the growth rate of 1961 dropping 0.1% from that of last year. Experts have said miracles will be needed for any growth increase, under the circumstances. Still the bluff.

A total of 3,214.5 billion hwan (1,300 hwan=1 U.S. dollar) will be invested within the five years of which 56% is to come from government sources and 44% from civilian sources. This stupendous amount of money is to be invested according to the following proportion: 554.4 billion hwan for primary industries; 1092.2 billion for secondary and 1,567. billion for tertiary industries. The growth rates aimed for each industries are: 35.8, 101.9 and 20.3% respectively.

By 1966, the target year, the gross national product is to reach 3,269.1 billion hwan as compared to 2,322.7 billion in 1960. Population will increase to 29,185,000 (24,994,000 in 1960) which means that per capita income will be 112,000 hwan ($86.1) as compared to 94,100 hwan ($72.4) in 1960. At the same time, the nation's employment rate is expected to be upped 28%; whereas annual population growth rate will be cut from the current 2.9% to 2.7% in 1966.

Destiny at Stake. In announcing the plan, Premier Song Yo-Chan stated that the fulfillment of the targets was an absolute necessity. His desparate tone denotes the fact that the militarists have staked their destiny on this economic adventure. But pitifully, all experts on Korea agree that the militarists have count-

ed their chickens before they're hatched. The reasons given are: The present economic environment of South Korea so depressed with business stagnation, shortages in capital, power sources and raw materials, low productivity, poor trade balance and lack of national fervor, hardly enables such costly and painstaking economic adventure. And, above all, the impossibility of building a self-sustaining economy for South Korea has been so disastrously proven by similar reconstruction plans attempted by the previous regimes under far better conditions. Further analysis will clarify our point:

Resources Totally Drained

No Lure to Private Capital. Of the total of 3,214.5 billion envisaged for investment during the five years, 1,786.4 billion will be provided by the government while 1,428.5 billion will come from civilian sources (See Table A). In contrast to the draft plan, government investment has been upped 10%. This indicates that some reflection has been done on the dark prospects of mobilizing civilian capital. As a matter of fact, the public has no surplus capital. All available resources have been totally drained in order to ride over the severe depression. Nextly, there must be some kind of lure to attract public interest toward the plan if the militarists are really serious about mobilizing private capital. Without any prospect of sharing in the pie, no businessman will be tempted to put a hand in. Unfortunately, the militarists do not understand such basic elements of economy, for "profits" are not calculated.

Furthermore, conditions are hardly favorable to incite any business fervor in the coming days. According to the Dec. 14 Report published by ROK Chamber of Commerce, enterprises not receiving UNKRA or ICA aids are producing at a lowly level of 40% capacity. When present installations are idle on account of capital shortage and sales difficulties, no business will be interested in investing in new projects. And as the Five-Year Plan puts emphasis on tightening commodity production, businesses can hardly get in the mood to cooperate. So, all things considered, hopeless is the word as regards mobilization of civilian capital.

Tunnelling of Funds. Investment plan for 1962 calls for 205.7 billion hwan from civilian sources and 287.4 billion

Table A

Investment (Capital Formation) Plan, 1962—66, by Gov. & Civilian Resources

(Prices: 1961 level; unit: 1 billion hwan)

	Government	Civilian	Total	Ratio
Primary Industry	409.4	145.0	554.7	17.2%
Agri. & Forestry	383.5	111.2	494.7	15.4
Marine & Fish.	25.9	33.8	59.7	1.8
Secondary Industry	551.2	540.0	1,092.2	34.0
Mining	42.5	139.2	181.7	5.7
Manufacturing	503.8	390.6	894.4	27.8
Construction	5.9	10.2	16.1	0.5
Tertiary Industry	824.8	743.1	1,597.9	48.8
Electricity	229.8	146.9	376.7	11.7
Transp. & Storage	228.0	166.7	394.7	12.3
Communications	108.2	—	108.2	3.4
Housing	67.4	330.9	398.3	12.4
Other Services	191.4	98.6	290.0	9.0
Total	1,786.4	1,428.1	3,214.5	100.0

from the government. The combined sum of 493.1 billion hwan is equivalent to 22% of grand national product of 1961 marking a lowly 2,320.4 billion hwan. To invest 22% of GNP, under the present circumstances, is an absolute impossibility. So, the militarists have thought up other stimulants such as low-interest loans and subsidies to attract private capital. Through these measures, about 650 billion hwan among the 1,786.4 billion to be invested by the government will ultimately be tunnelled into the accounts of big private concerns. This is over one-third of the total government investment. Such forceful "protectionism" for big business not underlined by due funds will inevitablely deepen the deficit finance and thus accelerate inflation. This protectionism, at the same time, implies dangers of capital running away towards more profitable sectors such as merchandising. At any rate, under the present state wherein one cannot sell one's product after going through all the painful labor of getting it produced nor having any prospect of the market improving, the militarists will surely need a magic wand to induce private investment.

No Hope of Foreign Aids

Unqualified Optimism. Nextly, while 2,326.0 billion hwan of the total capital investment is to be put up domestically, the remaining 885.0 billion hwan will be raised abroad. This is a big 28% of total investment. The most fantastic aspect of the plan is symbolized by this unqualified optimism in regards to foreign investment. Of this $683.6 million estimated for foreign investments, $426 million or 62% will be in foreign loans, $226 million or 33% in government holding dollars and the remaining $31.6 million or 5% in foreign aids. (See Table B)

Being a primary nation, South Korea's exports have always remained at a lowly level of about $30 million per year. Now, the Five-Year Plan is going to up exports 4.2 times to $132 million by 1966! And total exports during the 5 years will amount to $500 million or $100 million per year. Farm, dairy, marine and mineral products will occupy an overwhelming 69% of exports which means that the line of export goods will remain the same; whereas exports of manufactured and transformed products will still be down at low levels of 13 and 15% respectively. No

Table B

Investment (Capital Formation) Plan, 1962—66, by Foreign and Domestic Resources

(Prices: 1961 level; unit: 1 billion hwan)

	Foreign	Domestic	Total
Primary Industry	33.0	521.4	554.4
Agri. & Forestry	23.0	471.7	494.7
Marine & Fish.	10.0	49.7	59.7
Secondary Industry	474.4	617.8	1,092.2
Mining	66.3	115.4	181.7
Manufacturing	396.4	498.0	894.4
Construction	11.7	4.4	16.1
Tertiary Industry	381.1	1,186.8	1,567.9
Electricity	193.9	182.8	376.7
Transp & Storage	120.9	273.8	394.7
Communications	53.6	54.6	108.2
Housing	—	398.3	398.3
Other Services	12.7	277.3	290.0
Total	885.5	2,326.0	3,214.5

favorable condition is likely to be created in international competition. On the contrary, the doors of overseas markets will be narrowing. The militarists must be totally ignorant of the current trends of international trade in drawing up such impossible figures.

Decrease in U.S. Aid. Given the special mission to win over U.S. support for the Five-Year Plan, ROK Ambassador to Washington Chung made an attempt as early as July last year but to no avail. The U.S. Congress, after extensive review on foreign aids, made a big cut in the administration's fiscal 1962 foreign assistance appropriation. The dominant feeling among U.S. legislators was that U.S. overseas aids tend to bring about adverse results, that is, instead of strengthening democracy or rebuilding the economy of the recipient nation, the aids have gravitated economic conditions by inviting corruption and at times emergence of authoritarian governments. And, particularly, in relation to Korea, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded that "the result of $4,500 million U.S. foreign aid investment in South Korea have been discouraging to put the case mildly." So, U.S. aid to South Korea decreased.

The "dollar crisis" is another factor that is putting check on U.S. foreign aid increase. President Kennedy declared in his recent State of the Union Message to Congress that U.S., must continue its policies to improve the balance of payments. So, U.S. aid to Korea will be on the downtrend despite Park Chung Hee's conviction that U.S. would plug additional aid into Korea to bolster his government.

On January 11, Kim Yu-Taik, head of the Economic Planning Board, announced that fiscal 1962 AID assistance to Korea will be $90 million with possible addition of $30 million. ICA aid (ICA aids have been turned over to AID) during 1961 amounted to $165 million and up to 1959, the total always exceeded $220 million. U.S. surplus farm goods aid, however, will be increased by $10 million over last year amounting to $70 million. Still the total will reach only $190 million or $40 million less than 1961. And since surplus farm goods will occupy 24 to 31% of the total assistance, the decrease will be bigger substantially.

Expressing anxiety toward the aid decrease, the Jan. 17 Hankuk Ilbo wrote in its editorial: "We anticipated a situation like this to come sooner or later but did not expect that so big a cut would be done so suddenly. Confronting this grave reality, we must throw away our heretofore over-reliance on excessive foreign aid. Inspite of Chairman Park's visit to the United States and AID Chief Fowler Hamilton's tour of South Korea, there are no signs that the present trend in the U.S. aids turning favorable toward South Korea. The impression is that the United States is executing its basic policies quite free of any restraint from recipient nations."

European Nations Reluctant too. Rebuffed by the United States, the militarists turned toward other rich Western powers. An economic mission travelled through West Germany, France, Italy, Israel and negotiated for government loans and private investments, but, in terms of money, the mission failed in gaining any concrete agreement. According to informed sources in Tokyo, the European nations reportedly told South Korea that they would offer assistance once Japan decides to give a hand to help. These powers must have reasoned that Japan, after all, knows best about Korea and by putting off any commitment till Japanese decision, cleverly evaded possible attack from the public for venturing into such hopeless investment.

Thus the military government is putting forth an all-out effort to speed up the ROK-Japan talks so as to obtain Japanese economic cooperation. But recent developments in Japan have clouded all hopes of early accord between South Korea and Japan.

All told, the chances of the militarists acquiring the much-needed foreign investments are definitely slim. And without

Table C
Major Targets of Five-Year Plan

	Unit	Basic Year (A) 1960	Target Year (B) 1966	B/A
Grand National Product	billion hwan	2,322.7	3,269.1	140.8%
Private Consumption Expenditure	"	1,995.1	2,350.1	117.8
Gross Domestic Capital Formation	"	313.9	743.6	236.9
Government Consumption Expenditure	"	370.6	498.3	134.5
Population	1,000 persons	24,694	29,185	118.2
Working Population	"	10,394	11,868	114.2
Employed	"	7,877	10,111	128.3
GNP per capita	1,000 hwan	94.1	112.0	119.0

foreign support which is about the last resort since domestic resources have been totally drained, the plan has no hope of succeeding.

Sweats Without Reward

Lower Consumption Level. The military government declared that the plan will be carried out under the principle of free economic system with strong planning but, in truth, the militarists' goal is to rebuild the economy in the direction to strengthen the anti-Communist structure of South Korea. Priorities are to be given in the following order: energy sources such as electricity and coal, agriculture, key industries, national reconstruction service (mostly public works) projects, increase of export and advancement of technology. In other words, those industries which can boost war potential alone will be emphasized. The militarists' hidden aim is to make a try at building a solid military state. Thus hardly any heed is given to the problem of improving the lowly living standards.

In the draft plan, a breakdown of national income distribution was given but such has disappeared in the final plan. Still a rough outline of the distribution breakdown can be grasped from Table C which lists the major targets to be attained.

According to this Table, "Gross Domestic Capital Formation" will mark the highest growth rate of 236%, followed by "Government Consumption Expenditure" with 34% rise and the lowest will be "Private Consumption" with only 17.8% gain. Now the plan estimates a population growth of 18.2%. This means that the gain in Private Consumption will be totally offset. So, after five hard years of sweating, the nation is destined to find itself in a worse state of livelihood! Citizens are going to be paid less after the country has gained economic reconstruction!

Some more Frauds. The plan says that working population will be upped 28%. The figure, however, is calculated in proportion with the present employment level and not the total working population. Although 1.6 million more people will be employed according to the plan, working population, at the same time, will increase by 1.5 million which means that only 100 thousand new jobs will be created. Unemployment, therefore, will still be a serious problem.

The plan then estimates that exports will be upped 4.2 times by 1966; A deficit of $357 million however will remain in the balance of payments. This is $45 million more than the basic year. The plan claims that the deficit will be covered by invisible trade income estimated to double during the period, resulting in a surplus of $180 million. This is counting chickens before hatching again. As invisible trade represents U.S. aids, the reliance on foreign assistance will not decrease even at

the end of the program. And on top of everything, personal tax burdening rate is to be increased to 16% from the already over-burdening current rate of 13%. In short, the enforcement of this fantastic plan will bring but further hardships—heavier taxes, compulsory savings, slave labor and inflation—to the people.

Heavy Taxes and Slave Labor. In preparation for the launching of the Five-Year Plan, the militarists made a drastic reform in the tax collecting system. The emphasis has been shifted to indirect taxes which by nature are simpler in collecting and cause less friction. And thanks to this new system, the Ministry of Finance recently announced that 110.1% of the estimated tax revenue for 1961 have been collected as early as the end of November last year! This intensive tax collecting was done in a year when GNP dropped 0.1%.

On December 12, the government promulgated a "National Reconstruction Law" aimed at mobilizing idle labor for the numerous reconstruction "slave labor" camps. Under the law, camp deserters will be punished up to 3 years in prison. Furthermore, since last November, civil servants are ordered by law to deposit 1% of their monthly salaries.

So, when closely observed the Five-Year Plan does not promise anything to the nation except further impoverishment.

Criticisms by Experts

The following are criticisms on the Five-Year Plan by Korean experts carried in January 21 Korea Times:

Yu Chang-Soon, Governor of the Bank of Korea: The financial circles feel burdened with a great responsibility in that the plan calls for Korean private investment amounting to 1,400 billion hwan.

With the allocation of such huge amounts of financial investment without enough savings, it seems inevitable that inflation will result in the long run. On the other hand, banks should try to attract private capital investment for the development projects such as through the banks' direct investment, since we cannot rely only on the havings which have certain limits of their own. Especially, the central bank should play its leading role in financing to encourage private investment.

According to the economic plan, the estimated increased rate of non-governmental consumption would be prallel with that of the population during the projected period. This means that the individual consumption standard in the final year of the plan, 1966 would not be much different from that of the basic year. Extraordinary political leadership is necessary to attain the economic goal outlined in the plan.

Lee Hwal, President of the Korea Trades Association: According to the Five-Year Plan, the nation's export amount would reach $137 million in the final year of the plan, 1966, or about four times that of the $32 million in the basic year, 1960, and a little less than a quarter of the projected import amount in 1966. There also will be a remarkable increase of exports, compared with the trade balance in recent years when the exports were only one-tenth of imports.

However, it would not be easy to attain the final goal of promoting exports. In order to achieve the projected goal, the civilian trading circles should strive to increase exports while the government takes all possible measures and policies to promote the nation's export business.

Byung Hyung-Yoon, Professor of the College of Commerce, Seoul National University: It is regrettable that Korea's first Five-Year Plan was set up without consolidating statistics in various economic fields, which is a prerequisite to drafting

a workable and reliable economic plan.

In addition, one would pose the following questions regarding the plan:

1. Despite possible inflation which would be caused by an increase of "productive outlay" and lack of policy governing the supply of consumptive materials, would the economic goals described in the plan be attained as expected?

2. Can the whole amount of investment amounting to 3,200 billion hwan really be mobilized?

3. Would it be possible to expand the nation's export to $137.5 million in the final year of the plan, 1966, about four times the amount in the basic year of 1960?

4. The plan is only a "guide post" and it would naturally be diverted from its schedules in the course of its implementation. Will the countermeasures for such possible alteration of plans—such as rearrangement of implementation priority for various projects—be on hand for any needed changes?

5. The growth rate of the primary industry was drawn on the basis of 1960 when the Koreans enjoyed unusual bumper harvests. Since the harvest of a year depends almost entirely on natural conditions of the climate in Korea, wouldn't it be correct to fix the growth rate of primary industry in accordance with the average production rate of the past several years?

6. Despite the fact that an enormous number of technicians and engineers are needed to carry out the plan, no convincing plans were made on the problem of technique.

Sidelights

Fiscal 1962 National Budget

The Supreme Council passed the 1962 national budget bill amounting to 689.1 billion hwan on December 31. Although a cut of 18.6 billion was done on the bill, still the total surpasses the 1961 budget by 74.9 billion hwan. Emphasis is put on investment in the five-year plan, pay raise for civil servants and defense expenditure.

1962 Budget

(Unit; billion hwan)

Revenues	1962	1961	Increase	Expenditures	1962	1961	Increase
Tax Income	221.2	186.2	35.0	General Expenditures	258.7	241.7	17.0
Monopoly Income	32.0	26.5	5.5	Salaries	96.7	71.2	25.5
Miscellaneous	75.1	34.9	40.2	Others	162.0	170.5	—8.5
National Bonds	8.0	7.0	1.0	Defense	196.3	168.1	28.2
Industrial Recon. Bonds	18.7	31.7	—13.0	Investment	217.8	185.9	31.9
Loans	10.8	6.0	4.8	Others	16.3	18.5	—2.2
Carry-over	0	11.5	—11.5				
SUB-TOTAL	365.8	303.8	62.0				
Counterpart Fund	275.2	265.0	10.2				
Others	48.1	45.4	2.7				
SUB-TOTAL	323.3	310.4	12.9				
GRAND TOTAL	689.1	614.2	74.9	GRAND TOTAL	689.1	614.2	74.9

Frightful Conditions of Farm Hands

A rare and interesting study on the working conditions of ROK farm and fishing hands was done by Professor Eon Yeong-Jin of Seong-Kinkyan University Graduate School and announced in the Jan. 5 Minkook Ilbo. The study found out that these hands were working under frightful conditions so bad that they get only 30 cents for 17 hours of labor. The case is highly symbolic of the impoverished state of ROK farming and fishing villages.

Professor Eon selected 16 farm villages in ROK center of agriculture; 9 fishing villages on the east coast and another 12 mountain villages for his study in which 284 laborers were queried. The study found out, firstly, that 99.6% of all the laborers were hired through oral contracts, while only one hand had a written contract. 85.8% of the contracts were for one-year period and the remainder was for one season.

During the one-year period, most of the work hands were given day offs only for a week or so during the News Years and the summer festival season. Of those working for one season, 54.5% were given only one day of rest during the entire harvest season, while 5% were given a week's rest. The study describes in an indignant tone: "However strict the relations between master and servant, the laborers are not machines and require rest. But they must show up for work before sunrise and labor far into the night. The strain amounts to so much that sleeps becomes their only pleasure," and continues, "as results of overwork, the health of the laborers is undermined."

Despite such ruthless driving, their wages are frighteningly low. And they are not paid by cash but by actual goods (99%). The study discovered that 84% were paid with cleaned rice and 19.1% with rice stubble. As rice price is unstable and tends to fall, the substantial wage is lower than calculated in the deal. Now the average monthly wage of a farm hand is 1 suk of rice. And as annual earnings, 31.7% of those under one-year contracts earned 8 suks and the average earned about 12 suks. Converted at the market price of Jan. 20, an average work hand got about 9 dollars per month or about 30 cents per day.

With only 30 cents, nobody can carry on his existence. So when their earnings are spent, these laborers and their families must dig roots in order to continue their miserable existence. Why have these work hands fallen into such lot? The study explains that 87.6% of them do not have land and the debts owned compel them to work under such servile conditions.

5,887 hwan Deficit for Average ROK Worker

The Welfare Ministry recently announced a research on workshop and working conditions covering 371,479 employees of 16,117 government, public and private enterprises. The research found out that a worker with a family of six members was earning 50,063 hwan monthly while his living expenses amounted to 55,950 hwan thus resulting in a deficit of 5,887 hwan per month. The Supreme Council had recently announced that the gross national product for 1961 had fallen by 2.3 billion hwan or 0.1% from 1960, but the above figure is a clearer index showing the hard time the people are having under the current depression. Still, money supply hit a newrecord of 312.2 billion hwan at the year's end zooming 87.7 billion above the May 16 level. The public is now confronted by a dangerous inflation.

World-wide Protests Raised Against Hangings

Protests against the hanging of Cho Yong-Su, publisher of the Minjok Ilbo and Choi Paik-Keun, organization chief of the defunct ROK Socialist Party are pouring in before Chairman Park Chung Hee. The indignant voices ringing throughout the world have reached the highest pitches in condemning the criminal act. Though the cries cannot recall the dead, world opinion shall duly punish the bloody crimes in time.



Cho Yong-Su *Choi Paik-Keun*

Voices world-wide had pleaded for the lives of these heroic men but strongman Park pushed through his obstinate objective to victimize them for the sake of putting a Red-scare on the nation. World opinion calling in the name of humanity and justice was insolently ignored. The criminal action cannot be let by. Immediate protests have been filed in an all-out attack to condemn Park Chung Hee and his pack of blood thirsty followers.

On December 22, day after the execution, Korean organizations in Japan led by the White Leaf Club and the Choseon Chong-Ryun issued protests condemning the criminal action. The Japanese Council to Save the Lives of ROK Newsmen, Japanese Socialist Party and the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan wired protests to Chairman Park. The Japanese Jounalists Association, the International Organization of Journalists, the Outer Mongolian Journalists Association followed suit and such powerful presses as the Asahi of Japan, Manchester Guardian, Washington Post and Workers Shinmoon of North Korea charged the militarists in their editorials. The following are a part of the protests and editorials representing the indignation of thoughtful peoples of the world:

General Council of Trade Unions of Japan's Protest: "We feel profound indignation against the execution of publisher Cho Yong-Su of the Minjok Ilbo and organization chief. of ROK Socialist Party, Choi Paik-Keun. In behalf of 4 million workers of Japan, we strongly protest against the challenge made on humanity and democracy."

International Organization of Journalists: "The execution of publisher Cho Yong-Su on the charge of endorsing peaceful unification of Korea is a criminal act highly impeachable. The Organization requests all members and peoples of good faith throughout the world to condemn the ROK authorities concerned."

Manchester Guardian: The paper charged in its Dec. 22 editorial that the executions of Cho Yong-Su and Choi Paik-Keun were crimnal actions. It pointed out that the endorsement of North-South exchange was not a crime when Choi promoted the policy line and also that most Koreans themselves do not believe in the charges of promoting Communism put on Cho and his two colleagues. The editorial condemned that the crime had made all the efforts by the ROK junta to better its prestige within the non-Communist world nonsensical.

Message Sent by Yongjeung Kim, President of the Korean Affairs Institute in Washington, to General Park Chung Hee: "I was stunned to learn of the recent execution of Cho Yong-Su, publisher of the disbanded Minjok Ilbo, and of the imprisonment for life of his associates, Song Ji-Yung and Ahn Shin-Kyu. I am afraid that such a brutal show of injustice by your junta will lose the goodwill of the freedom-loving peoples of the world. While supported by the democratic nations, mainly the United States, you seem to trample upon their principles without inhibition. As a Korean I am ashamed and saddened.

Frankly I cannot help but observe that your junta is repeating the policy of the Syngman Rhee regime. Those then in power thought that so long as they blew the horn of anti-Communism the United States would have to support them and perpetuate them in power. Yet the Korean people finally threw them out. To atone in some degree for the dastardly crime against the Minjok Ilbo publisher, I suggest that you free the two other newspapermen. Moreover, I hope that you are brave enough to restore the freedom of the press.

Washington Post: The paper wrote in its Dec. 28 editorial that all free people of the world sympathizes with the indignation being felt by the Korean residents in the United States against the execution of publisher Cho Yong-Su of the Minjok Ilbo by the ROK military government. The paper agreed with the President of the Korean Affairs Institute Yongjeung Kim's view that such a brutal show of injustice by the junta will lose the goodwill of the freedom-loving peoples of the world. The editorial concluded that the United States would not go on giving aid to such government which suppresses the freedom of speech.

December 21, 1961 became another black day in the annals of the tragical history of the Korean nation. Humanity, also, suffered a day of blashphemy at the hands of these mad men. One cannot hate enough the evil done. Mankind must mourn over the sin committed but history tells us that justice shall be served on the doers of such evil.

Prohibition of Funeral for the Executed

The military junta announced an ordinance on January 16 banning all funeral and memorial services for those executed on "anti-revolutionary" charges. The ordinance stipulates that no one shall hold public funeral or memorial services for; exhibit or circulate portraits or writings of; hold memorial assemblies or erect tombs or monuments for those persons executed or died after confirmation of death sentence or deceased while serving life imprisonment.

It is the innermost feeling of kindness and sense of duty that mankind sepulchres its dead. What right is there that the militarists should deprive this most sacred right to mourn deeply for the deceased? The militarists who cannot rest assured even after suspending all conceivable human rights, must now intrude into the religious life of the nation in order to offset any expression of antipathy towards the military government.

The action clearly shows the desparate state of the militarists' mind. Finding themselves cornered from all sides, they must keep growling so as to keep the enfuriated nation at bay. They have forbidden the nation to mourn and sepulchre its patriotic heroes, namely, publisher Cho Yong-Su of the Minjok Ilbo and Choi Paik-Keun, organization chief of the ROK Socialist Party, who died as martyrs of the peaceful unification struggle last Dec. 21. In committing such cruelty only conceivable by the devil himself, the militarists have certainly dug their own graves.

FREQUENT COUNTER-COUP PLOTS

Isolation of Junta

Plots to assassinate Chairman Park Chung Hee are springing up like mushrooms after the rain. Although these plots were conspired by men equally hungry for power as the present junta leaders, the incidents show how far isolated from the nation the military government has become.

Six Counter-Coup Plots. The alleged "counter-revolutionary" plot schemed by former Supreme Council Chairman Chang Do Yung, of course, highlights all, but to this day, six seperate plots to overthrow the military government have been uncovered. They are the plots by the following groups: Kim Il-Whan, Ju Hyung, Kim Dong-Bok, New Heroism Group, Lee Chong-Heun, and the Blue Shirts National Youth Corps. The first three counter-coup plots were schemed during the early stages of the military government; whereas the latter three were uncovered recently and the new trend is that civilians have become central figures in the conspiracies. The following are rough outlines of the plots as made public by the authorities:

New Heroism Group

This group led by Lee Min-Kyoo, ex-member of Democratic Party's inspection committee, organized an underground ring by the name of "New Heroism Group" comprising three other civilians. The objective of the group was to overthrow the military government and restore the Democratic regime through a coup d'etat. The uprising date was set for late February 1962 whereby they were to assassinate Chairman Park Chung Hee, Premier Song Cho-Yang and seven other ranking leaders of the present regime employing 30 assassins. For necessary funds, the group contacted an unidentified chief of ex-Democratic inspection committee and several families of political prisoners. The plotters also sent letters to an incumbent general for collaboration and selected an imprisoned general to become the "revolutionary martial law commander" during the frustrated period of the revolution. The plot, however, leaked and all four were rounded up on January 5.

Chu Hyung Group

This group of seven conspirators led by Chu Hyun, ex-member of Korean Independence Party planned to stage a coup d'etat on January 16, 1962. Their plan was to occupy the headquarters of the Capital Defense Command and Seoul Broadcasting Station. The lives of Chairman Park and Premier Song were to be taken and a "revolutionary" cabinet set up, led by Kim Chang-Suk, a noted Confucian leader, as president, Chu Hyung, chief conspirator, as premier, and a certain Park as defense minister. Kim Hyung-Yung, policy making chairman of a social organization during the Democratic rule, was engaged in writing books to support the Democratic restoration. This plot also was uncovered beforehand and all seven plotters were arrested on January 5.

"Blue Shirt" National Youth Corps

This group was put on "revolutionary trial" January 11. The indictment charged the defendants of the following conspiracy: Paik Don-Ki, leader of the

group, and his six co-conspirators planned in August last year to topple the junta and establish a new regime headed by former premier Lee Bum-Suk, founder of the corps. They contacted army officers in order to enlist the services of the 8th Division in the takeover but failed in arresting support. The plotters also schemed to kill both Chairman Park and Col. Kim Chong-Pil, head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Co-defendants of the case are Mrs. Kim Jung-Ye, Col. Whang Byong-Ho, Kim Chang-Nam, Lee Jin-Hyung, Ahn Shin-Hong and Kim Il-Soo.

Kim Il-Whan Group

This group of five military men was put on trial last Oct. 21 and the indictment charged that: "Kim Il-Whan, Chung Won-Sang, both ex-members of the junta and three others plotted to oust Park and his aides by seizing the Central Intelligence Agency and arresting Park. Once the plot succeeded, the defendants were to take over the government and continue the military rule with Chang Do Yung as their leader." All five were arrested in early July and put on trial with Chang Do Yung. Verdicts were passed down on January 10 whereby ex-colonels Kim Il-Whan and Chung Won-Sang received life imprisonments.

Lee Hoe-Yung Group

17 former military officers led by ex-Col. Lee Hoe-Yung, former secretary of Chang Do Yung, and ex-Col. Park Chi-Ok were put on "revolutionary" trial on Oct. 22 on charges of plotting an overthrow of the military government. According to the indictment, these defendants, bearing grudges against Central Intelligence Agency Chief Col. Kim Chong-Pil, gradually drifted away from the central force of the junta and sided with Chang Do Yung. They plotted to monopolize the government by liquidating Park Chung Hee and his aides. The counter-coup did not fire and all suspects were arrested with Chang Do Yung in early July. On January 10, the defendants were given their verdicts with Lee Hoe-Yung getting the death penalty and Park Chi-Ok life imprisonment.

Kim Dong-Bok Group

Trial on former Colonel Kim Dong-Bok and Lt. Col. Cho Sang-Hoon charged with plotting a counter-coup opened on October 13. The indictment charged that Kim, dissatisfied with the military government, persuaded Cho and another in a plot to obstruct the revolution. By mobilizing tank, infantry, and engineer corps, Kim schemed to seize the government by overthrowing the revolutionary government. The defendants were given their verdicts on January 10 with Kim getting life imprisonment and Cho 3 years in prison.

Comments

Unquenchable Factionalism. Incomparable factionalism is one real sore spot of the ROK armed forces. In order to avoid open inner warfare, the junta disposed such powerful military leaders as Lt. Gen. Lee Hal-Lim, former commander of the 1st Army, and Lt. Gen. Choe Kyung-Nok, former commander 2nd Army, and some 40 other high grade officers immediately after the takeover.

The junta leaders thought that the mass purges would put an end to all the intra-military strife going on for years, but new rivalries sprung up before long. Then there are feuds going on between the top brasses and the up-coming. The antagonism came to the surface when the Special Investigation Committee Scandal was spilled wide open. The junta, reportedly, had to give in to the younger officers' pressure to put an end to the conspicuous corruption going on in the Committee which should have probed rigously into the cases of illicit profiteering. Although nearly all the members of the Committee, made up mostly of military men, were arrested and put on trial, the junior officers still could not be satisfied because its Chairman Maj. Gen. Lee Choo-Il alone was not only left untouched but promoted to the post of Supreme Council Vice-Chairman instead.

On Top of Dynamite. Being situated on top of dangerous dynamite, the junta

cannot abolish the martial law despite the unpopularity of having it in force for 8 months already. And on top of the martial law, the junta, according to reliable sources, has posted some 10,000 secret service agents in Seoul alone ready to report any smell of subversive activity among the citizens and the military men as well. Countless agents, at the same time, have been infiltrated into all sectors and walks of the national life.

The junta leaders have due reason to be over-suspicious, for inspite of the mass purges of military men and this gigantic secret service set-up, counter-coup plots are following one after another. And thanks to this dragnet, they have been lucky so far.

Total Isolation. In terms of historical significance, the six anti-junta plots above were but trifling incidents. The characters involved were power hungry men only interested in seizing the government following the fashion displayed by the present rulers. However, these incidents duly testify to the fact that the military government has become totally isolated from the entire nation including the army itself.

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10 Years for Gen. Kim *(Continued from Page 8)*

position of the Park faction can hardly be said secure. On the contrary, the actions have virtually turned the entire armed forces against the junta. The frailty of the junta's position can be seen in the following points:

1. Park's own followers within the army is about nil. Before the takeover, Park was an obscure figure without any merits nor followers in the army. Former commander of 8th Army Corps Brig. Gen. Chung-Kang, testifying in the 6th Army Corps Case, struck the point: "I doubted my ears when I heard that the May 16 coup was led by Maj. Gen. Park."

2. Neither those other men like Supreme Council Vice-chairman Lee Choo-Il nor Central Intelligence Agency Chief Kim Chong-Pil influential in the junta have power or popularity among the rank and file of the army. The abusing of power by these men, on the contrary, is creating vast resentment and, in addition, an open feud is going on between the two.

3. Park has promoted generals Park Byung-Keun, Kim Chong-O Park Im-Hang and Min Ki-Shik to the posts of defense minister, army chief of staff, and commanders of 1st and 2nd Armies in order to strengthen his hold on the armed forces but these men are only interested in going up the ladder and do not possess much supporters in the army.

4. Despite their staying in the United States, generals Lee Hal-Lim, Choi Kyong-Nok and Kang Yong-Hoon are still excercising vast influences over the army, Choi has been criticizing the illegality of the military government in America, and his supporters in the army are said to be resolidifying their unity.

5. The young officers who have graduated from the 4-year course ROK Military Academy (8th Graduates had only 6 months of schooling) are reported to be grouping in the direction to oppose the junta.

The present factional map of the ROK armed forces, therefore, shows that the remnants of the Lee Hal-Lim, Choi Kyong-Nok and Pyongan-do factions are resolidifying their unity with aims to bring down the military government and the younger officers are grouping in the direction to oppose the junta. The calm being maintained now owes itself to the U.S. support being given to the junta and also the U.S. pressure being put on the anti-junta factions. But the calm will not hold very long. As the tyranny and mal-administration of the Park regime are worsening each day, the feuds within the army will burst out into the open any moment.

NEWS OF THE MONTH

Dec. 24 to jan. 23.

Chang Do Yung Given Death Sentence

On Jan. 10, Lt. Gen. Chang Do Yung, former army chief of staff and ex-chairman of the military junta was sentenced to death for "obstructing the military takeover last May 16." Chang had been on trial since last October with 23 other army officers of which Col. Lee Hoe-Yung, Chang's former secretary was also given the capital punishment, while 4 ex-colonels received life terms and nine other defendants prisons terms from 5 to 15 years. When the verdicts were passed, women relatives of the defendants wailed in their seats and the aged mother of Chang fainted. Chang was found guilty of ordering coup troops to remain in their units and not participate in the May 16 takeover; getting former U.N. Commander Gen. Carter B. Magruder and other American officials to oppose the takeover and 3 other counts.

Prison Terms Upheld Against Leaders of Self-Unification

On Jan. 19, the appellate tribunal of the Revolutionary Court upheld prison terms ranging from 5 to 15 years on eleven leaders of the disbanded National Council for Self-Unification. Seven officials of the defunct Federation of Korean Teachers Trade Unions were also finalized their sentences. The court stated in its verdicts that the defendants were found guilty of supporting the political lines of the North Korean Communist regime. Given 15 years were Lee Chong-Shin and Ki Le-Choong, leaders of the council and Kang Ki-Chul. former senior vice chairman of the teachers union. Another was given 12 years, seven, 10 years and the remtaining seven 5 years in prison.

6 Mothers Questioned by Police for Collective Action

On Jan. 19, six mothers of unsuccessful candidates to enter high schools were questioned by the police on the suspicion of violating the decree banning all illegal assemblies. The police sought to detain them but the court turned down the police request to issue warrants. Due to the big slash made on high school enrollment, nearly 5,000 students graduating middle school failed to enter high schools as results of the recent government supervised examinations. A large group of mothers visited the Supreme Council on Jan. 17 to appeal for an increase in the accomodation capacity but were turned back by the police on grounds that they were violating the decree regulating assemblies. Despite the Seoul District Court's refusal, the police continued inquiry into the collective action.

Nation-Wide Savings Drive

On Jan. 20, the government decided to enforce setting up a nation-wide savings cooperation in a campaign to accumulate 200 million hwan to bolster implementation of the projected five-year economic development plan. This compulsory saving will be launched with the establishment of the cooperative envisaging a saving of some 40 million for 1962. As a matter of fact, all government officials have already been compelled to save 1% of their earnings since last October but new ceilings for savings by all government officials and private concerns and organizations will be determined by legal measures to be announced shortly.